By Yaakov katz
There was the cover of Time magazine – “Attack and Fallout” – showing Israel’s successful strike against Saddam Hussein’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, a mission that Yadlin took part in as a pilot.
There was the poster he received from STS-107, the crew of the Columbia space shuttle, before it took off on a mission from which the members – including his friend and fellow Osirak pilot Ilan Ramon – would not return.
There was something else on the wall as well: a framed two-page certificate with two medals and a ribbon awarded by the US Director of National Intelligence. It was the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, given for meritorious action on behalf of America’s national security interests.
When asked what the certificate and medals were for, Yadlin would usually refuse to answer. The most he would say is that he is the only person in the world to have participated in 2.5 missions to destroy enemy nuclear programs.
The first – the bombing of Osirak – is well-known; the second only recently came out of the shadows: in 2007 he oversaw intelligence collection and planning for the successful attack against Syria’s nuclear reactor while serving as head of Military Intelligence. And the third? That he wouldn’t say.
But people in the know likely understand what it is about. Yadlin was still head of Military Intelligence in 2010 when reports came out about a mysterious cyber worm that had infected Natanz, Iran’s most important nuclear facility.
It was called Stuxnet, and later reports confirmed the virus was a joint Israeli-American mission led by the National Security Agency and the IDF’s Unit 8200. Stuxnet succeeded in knocking out over 1,000 centrifuges in the Natanz enrichment halls and setting back the ayatollah’s race to nuclear dominance.
Twelve years later, Israel still doesn’t admit that it was behind the worm. As a result, every article in the Israeli media relies on “foreign media reports.” And responsible (alleged) participants in the operation like Yadlin still refuse to speak about it.
Contrast that silence and ambiguity with the non-stop babble coming out of Israel in recent weeks over its alleged various attacks against Iran. On Sunday, for example, just hours after an “accident” at Natanz, Israeli officials began speaking to the media claiming that it was far from being an accident but rather a deliberate attack carried out by Israel.
To create some subterfuge, a game was played and officials asked reporters to attribute the news to “Western officials,” even though those officials were no farther than West Tel Aviv.
The quick claim of responsibility followed the controversy just a week earlier, when another Israeli official (or maybe the same one) leaked details of an attack against an Iranian ship seemingly before the mission had even taken place.
On their own, each of these cases is irresponsible. Together, they make it seem like everything is out in the open on “purpose.”
This is the new Israel, lawless and ownerless.
All this chatter is a sharp break from standard Israeli operating procedure. For years Israel stayed silent after attacking Iranian targets in Syria, neither confirming nor denying its involvement; it remained quiet after Stuxnet; and more famously, lips were sealed for more than a decade after Israel bombed Syria’s nuclear reactor.
The change in strategy was first felt a few weeks ago, when reports emerged in the foreign media on how Israel has been striking Iranian ships in the Mediterranean and Red Sea for a number of years. Someone, it seemed, had an interest in getting the story out now, so to do that the mystery source went to the foreign press.
Naturally, Iran started to retaliate within days because Israel had publicly humiliated Tehran – the ayatollahs had no choice but to respond.
Over the last month three Israeli-owned vessels have been attacked. While thankfully no one was injured and damage was limited, Iran was sending a clear message: you attack one of our ships, we will attack one of yours.
Looking back over the last two decades, the policy of ambiguity served Israel well. When it stayed quiet after striking Syria’s Al Kibar reactor, it did so in order to avoid publicly humiliating Bashar al-Assad, giving him the opportunity – which he took – to save face and not retaliate.
That same policy worked for years when Israel attacked Iranian entrenchment in Syria. The attacks were numerous and constant, taking place some months on a weekly basis. But except for a few rare instances, Iran did not respond. As with Syria, Israel created an understanding with the Iranians by not saying anything publicly: yes, we will attack you, but we won’t humiliate you.
This has changed, and we need to ask why.